Saturday 7 April 2012

Admiral of the Fleet

During the war Hitoshi Yamamoto was appointed Admiral of the Fleet, a high ranking and honourable position.
 

The fleet itself was small and consisted of some 20 ships of varying sizes. Unlike most fleets, their Admiral did not base himself on the flagship but on a much smaller vessel with a small crew.
 

Admiral Yamamoto changed this over the course of his ten year reign. His personal crew became one of the largest ever seen for an Admiral and he demanded total loyally from them, way above that previously required. No criticism was brooked and any officer unwise enough to try and voice any concerns was quickly stamped on and usually removed from the ship.
 

In a Fleet it is the Admiral’s job to effect the strategy choices of the War Cabinet. Yamamoto had other ideas and soon built himself an impregnable power base from which he ruled the fleet as he saw fit.
 

In a superb strategist this might not have been problem, but Yamamoto was not such a man. His strength lay in persuading others that his was the finest fleet the country had ever seen and that everything was shipshape.
 

Unfortunately, this was not true. The sailors knew it, the captains knew it, but Yamamoto’s grip of steel would not allow any criticism of his fleet or its efficiency.
 

It was Yamamoto who decided when and where the fleet sailed and he did this with little regard to the overall war strategy. His was the right way and nobody else was allowed a viewpoint.
 

Eventually some brave captain did try to change things but the end result was a court martial, something previously unknown for such a “crime”.
 

The uniqueness of this event did prompt some concern at the highest levels but nothing was done and there was little publicity as this might have lowered moral in times of war.
 

By this time Yamamoto himself had withdrawn from public view and had begun to take a keen interest in the providing and provisioning of new ships for his fleet. The first of these new vessels was state of the art and came in on budget and on time. Well, in Yamamoto’s world it did; in the real world the ship was too expensive, fault riddled and  late being handed over for commissioning.


 Despite this, and the general shortage of funds due to the world situation, more ships were commissioned and Yamamoto was said to have taken a keen interest in this project; so much so that he really didn't devote the time that he should to his real job as commander of the fleet.
 

Yamamoto kept telling his lords and masters, and whoever else would listen, that the war was going well and for a time people believed him despite the obvious failings of a lot of the common seamen. Battles were being lost but propoganda continued to say that everything was fine and they were winning the war effort.
 

But eventually something had to give and it became clear that the war effort was not going well at all. In fact, aside from the flagship, where little expense had been spared, the rest of the fighting force was in a varying state of repair and were some of the worst performing ships in the war.
 

At this stage an honourable man would have fallen on his sword. 

Sadly, there were a lack of honourable men in the higher ranks of the navy by now. The Chief of Navy Staff in the War Cabinet refused to budge and kept defending Yamamoto, flying in the face of all of the evidence and common sense. Eventually, they were forced to take the sword and it was expected that Yamamoto would do the same.
 

But Yamamoto was made of different stuff. He refused to accept the criticisms but said that at his age it was time to start winding down. He would relinquish the role of Admiral but stay in the top echelons as an overseer of new ship builds and provisions. His qualifications for this role were minimal but such was his power that his wishes were law.
 

When all of the details came to light nobody could understand how the situation was allowed to get so bad. Those that should have known professed to have been mislead by Yamamoto into believing that black was white.
 

His captains knew of the problems but even those who had the courage to approach the Cabinet with concerns were dismissed or hushed up all in the name of preserving moral. In the face of such a response the rest had stayed silent.
 

Everybody who should have known did know something but nobody was brave enough to do anything about it.
 

And so the war was lost.
 

Yamamoto was blamed but never punished.
 

Why was that?
 


Some say it was because of what he knew. Others suggested that it was impossible for the War Cabinet to fully investigate because the trail would have eventually led to their own doorstep.


In no other fleet in the world would such a series of events be allowed to happen and punishment would have been seen as just and inevitable.


But this navy was different.


A full scale report of the event was commissioned and its recommendations taken on board by the Cabinet. The navy had other ideas however and everything started to get watered down.

Where did it all end up?


More importantly, what has this got to do with modern day Guernsey?
 

Go figure.

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